Indiana Law Journal
Volume 14

Issue 2

Article 9

12-1938

Independent Contractor-Injury Caused by Contractor Operating
Vehicle Under Carrier's Permit

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Torts Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1938) "Independent Contractor-Injury Caused by Contractor Operating Vehicle Under Carrier's Permit,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 14 : Iss. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol14/iss2/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

RECENT C/1SE NOTES
where the ends of justice, under the circumstances, would otherwise be
defeated. 4 A state may appeal before or after a verdict, if the appeal does
not affect the defendant; a judge or a juror may die or become insane; a
jury may be discharged for misbehavior; a jury may fail to agree on a
verdict and be discharged. In all these cases there is no legal jeopardy
though a lawful jury has been impaneled and sworn and it is said that
jeopardy attaches at that moment. 5 Improper statements by the defense
counsel injecting new issues were held as a matter of law to be justifiable
cause for discharge of the jury.8 Juror's illness, conduct of witness, spectator,
or attorney,7 and similar occurrences, taking place without fault of defendant,
may, as regards former jeopardy, be sufficient ground for declaring mistrial. 8
Evidently in this case, the Supreme Court in overruling the lower court's
judgment, decided that the trial judge erred in discharging the jury; that
there was no legal necessity for the discharge of the jury. Here the trial had
barely begun. Had this prisoner been placed in danger of his life or limb?
True, the administration of justice requires that verdicts, criminal as well as
civil, shall be found by impartial juries, and shall be the result of honest
deliberations absolutely free from prejudice or bias. Further, it will not be
disputed that a prisoner should not be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense. But the public as well as the accused have rights which must be
safeguarded. It is this policy which demands that the court be clothed with
the power to judge the necessity for discharging a jury.9 In every case of
this sort, however, the court must exercise a very sound discretion on the
facts, and this power must obviously be used with the greatest caution.1 O
In the principal case the trial court seems to have followed the modern trend,
which the Supreme Court has rejected. In so doing the Supreme- Court, the
writer believes, has failed to balance sufficiently the policies underlying this
proposition of double jeopardy. It has followed a strict interpretation of the
rules laid down by the older cases on this point in preference to the majority
viewpoint in the United States.
I. D. B.
INDEPENDENT

CONTRACTOR, LIABILITY FOR AcTs oF-INJuRY CAUSED BY CON-

VEHICLE UNDER CARRIER'S PERmrr.*-Action "by Mayer,
administrator, against defendant corporation for death of motorist in collision
caused by truck driver's negligence. The truck causing the injury was owned
by the truck driver subject to a mortgage, although defendant's name was on
it. Defendant held a permit from the Public Service Commission of Indiana
to operate the truck as a common carrier. The trucks were operated on
TRACTOR

OPERATING

4 Thompson v. United States (1894), 155 U. S. 271, 15 S. Ct. 73; United
States v. Perez (1824), 22 U. S. 579, 6 L. ed. 165? Dreyer v. People (1900),
188 II. 40, 58 N. E. 620, 58 L. R. -A. 869; People v. Simos (1931), 345 Ill.
226, 178 N. E. 188.
5 Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 529.
6 Commonwealth v. Cronin (1926), 257 Mass. 535, 15 N. E. 176.
7 But recently Justice Pecora of the New York Supreme Court in the Hines
case discharged the jury' on the ground of an improper question to a witness
by the prosecutor. Certainly in this case Hines could not be said to have
been in jeopardy.
8 People v. Simos (1931), 345 Ill. 226, 178 N. E. 188.
9 State v. Slorah (1919), 118 Me. 203, 106 Atl. 768, 4- A. L. R. 1256.
10 United States v. Perez (1824), 22 U. S. 579, 6 L. ed. 165.
* Two cases discussed.
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schedule and carried only interstate commerce. The contract between the
driver and defendant permitted the driver to receive freight charges, deprived
him of authority to transport goods not designated by defendant, and provided
he was to be paid a percentage of the freight charges. Held, defense of
independent contractor not available. Bates Motor Transport Lines, Inc. v.
Mayer (Ind. 1938), 14 N. E. (2d) 91.
Personal injury action by passenger against defendant Swallow Coach
Lines, which operated a bus line by an agreement with defendant Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines and under a certificate issued to the latter by the
Public Service Commission of Indiana. The lease contract between the two
defendants was unknown to the plaintiff; it provided that the lessee should
receive a percentage of the gross receipts and should indemnify the lessor for
damages. Held, Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines' separate demurrer to the
complaint properly overruled; rule of Bates case applies although no allegation of irresponsibility in defendant Swallow Coach Lines. Swallow Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Cosgrove (Ind. 1938), 15 N. E. (2d) 92.
The reasons set forth in the cases for the rule of nonliability of one who
1
The idea is that the conemploys an independent contractor are numerous.
tractor and not the contractee is the entrepreneur in the activity which is the
immediate cause of the injury, and for that reason should bear the risk. Such
an analysis, i. e., in terms of the administration of the risk, has been shown
to be a plausible basis for the general doctrine. 2 However, the language of
the courts has continued to be that liability will not be imposed for the wrongful conduct of an enterprise over which the employer has no control. For
this reason the relation of master and servant is not held to exist when the
employee is under the control of the employer only as to the result and not
as to the means of accomplishing it.3 It is clear, however, that the test is not
the actual exercise of the right by interfering with the work, but rather the
right to control. 4 The question of the seat of the right to control is one of
6
fact for the jury. 5 This is true although there is no conflict in the evidence,
7
and although there is a written agreement between the parties.
1 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929), 38 Yale
L. J. 584.
2 Idem. 594 ff. Professor Douglas' article is no panacea for this difficult
problem but it does rebut the criticism of the principle by such writers as Baty.
[Baty, Vicarious Liability (1916) 154]. It suggests that considered in terms
of "risk avoidance," "risk shifting," "risk distribution," and "risk prevention,"
the rule is not unsound and that writers of the Baty school were victims of
the period in which they wrote.
3Mechem, The Law of Agency, 2d ed., Sec. 40; American Law Institute,
Restatement of Agency; Sec. 220.
4Sargent Paint Co. v: Petrovitsky (1919), 71 Ind. App. 353, 124 N. E.
881, 40 A. L. R. 1416; Pappillo's Admx. v. Prairie (1933), 105 Vt. 193, 164
A. 537; Mechem, The Law of Agency, 2d ed., Sec. 1917.
5Tiburne v. Burton (1927), 86 Cal. A. 627, 261 P. 334; Goyette v. P. J.
Kennedy & Co. Inc. (1931), 277 Mass. 283, 178 N. E. 528; Bauer v. Calic
(1934), 166 Md. 387, 171 A. 713; McKay v. Pacific Bldg. Materials Co.
(1937), 156 Ore. 578, 68 P. (2d) 127; Tierney v. Correia (1937), 123
Conn. 146, 193 A. 201.
6Lee Moor Contracting Co. v. Blanton (Ariz. 937), 65 P. (2d) 35. The
court indicated that reasonable persons might reach different conclusions on
the evidence as to who had the control or right to control at the time.
7 Fleming v. Ambulance Co. (1936), 155 Or. 351, 62 P. (2d) 1331.
The
meaning of the written agreement was held not perfectly clear.
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In cases involving motor vehicles, virtual acceptance of the doctrine that
"control of the man behind the wheel is the same as control of the wheel . . ."8
has caused the other tests of the master-servant relationship to become of little
significance. An employee, owning and driving his own vehicle, will be held
a servant or an independent contractor, according as the jury finds or does not
find a right to control in the employer. The manner of payment of the truck
9
An employee has been held an independent contractor
owner is immaterial.
was
hauling the employer's semi-trailer upon which were
his
truck
although
the employer's license plates, and although the employer was a manufacturer
of trailers and this one was being transported for completion.1O An employee
hauling sand and being paid according to the amount hauled was an independent contractor although the name of the employer was painted on the
truck, the hauling contract was oral, and all of the employer's trucks had been
11
exclusively used for two years to carry out such contract.
The distinction between independent contractor and servant, however, has
long been held of no avail in certain situations. The exception to the general
rule of the nonliability of one employing an independent contractor involved
here is the case of a "nondelegable" duty. Such a duty exists in a carrier by
virtue of its charter privileges and franchises. The duty has been held to
2
and
exist because another view would allow a wrong without a remedy'
by placing the employer in the position of a joint tort-feasor.13 The principal
cases, relying heavily on Clev.eland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Simpson (1915), 182 Ind.
693, 704, 104 N. E. 301, 108 N. E. 9, reason from the idea of the employer as a
joint tort-feasor. Courts have very generally, in similar cases, spoken of the
duty, the hazard of the enterprise and the element of control. But since in
both instant cases there was a franchise from the state, the decisions might
well have been solely on the basis of the inability of the carrier to delegate
its duty to the public and its passengers. The performance alone, and not
the liability for failure to perform the duty, may be delegated, and this is
true although the employee is a distinct company incorporated to do the act
involved. The instant cases thus establish that in the case of such franchises,
an employee of a carrier will be held its agent as between the carrier and
14
the public, despite the fact it might otherwise be an independent contractor.
The instant cases are interesting as examples of the constantly increasing
"exceptions" to the present general rule and as support for the suggested
8 Heintz v. Iowa Packing Co. (1936), 222 Iowa 517, 268 N. W. 607.
9 Ellis & Lewis Inc. v. Trimble (1936), 177 Ok. 5, 57 P. (2d) 244; Gulf
Coast Motor Express Co. v. Diggs (1936), 174 Miss. 650, 165 So. 292. Mechem,
The Law of Agency 2d ed., Sec. 1871.
10 Fuller v. Palazzolo (Penn., 1938), 197 A. 225.
11 Riggs v. Haden (1936), 127 Tex. 314, 94 S. W. (2d) 152.
12 Economy Cabs, Inc. v. Kirkland (1937), 127 Fla. 867, 174 So. 222.
13 Hough v. Central States Freight Service, Inc. (1936), 222 Iowa 548, 269
N. W. 1. A note discussing this case in 50 Harvard L. Rev. 828 suggests that
without evidence that the employer was systematically using independent contractors to evade the statute, it might have been unwarranted to hold him
liable on the broad principle that an employer is liable for the torts of an
independent contractor if the act contracted for is unlawful.
14 Cushman Motor Delivery Co. v. Smith (1935), 131 Ohio 68, 1 N. E. (2d)
628; Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co. (1935), 337 Mo. 270, 85 S. W. (2d) 80.
An extensive annotation in 28 A. L. R. 122 treats thoroughly the delegation
of the performance of duties correlative to corporate franchises.
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desirable change to liability of the employer of an independent contractor for
all tortious acts of the latter and his servants and the confinement of nonliability to a few exceptional situations. 1 5
W. A. V.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPOSITOR OF COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK-BANK
COLLECTION CODE.-The defendant, a Louisiana manufacturer, drew a draft on
a milling company in South Carolina for the purchase price of a shipment of
rice. The draft was made payable to .a local Louisiana bank and was
deposited in that bank under a deposit slip customarily used by it for cash
items which contained a provision printed at the top, "In receiving items
for deposit or collection, this bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent
and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise of due care. All items are
credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent credits whether returned
or not." The evidence was that unconditional credit was immediately given
the milling company. The bank received iriterest, termed a .discount, on the
amount of the draft for the time that the draft was outstanding. In due
course, the draft and attached papers were sent to correspondent bank in
South Carolina. The day the draft was collected by the correspondent, the
plaintiff attached the proceeds in South Carolina for satisfaction of an unliquidated demand against the defendant depositor. The initial bank intervened on the appeal, claiming to be the owner of the fund. Held, title passed
to the initial bank at time of the deposit and therefore the plaintiff could not
attach the proceeds. Campbell v. Noble-Trotter Rice Milling Co. (S. C. 1938),
198 S. E. 373.
The increase in use of commercial paper in the United States under our
great credit system of business has left a multitude of irreconcilable decisions
on the circumstances under which a bank, in taking from a customer a check
or draft in the usual course of its banking business, will become the owner
of such check or draft as distinguished from a mere collecting agent for the
customer. It has been generally recognized in regard to bank deposits that
where a deposit is made in a bank in the ordinary course of business, the title
to the money or to the drafts or checks deposited, in the absence of any special
agreement or direction, passes to the bank, and the relation of debtor and
creditor arises between the depositor and the bank.1 Where the facts and
circumstances accompanying the deposit indicate an understanding between
the parties that the commercial paper is deposited for collection only, the
15 Comment, Responsibility for the torts of an independent contractor, 39
Yale L. J. 861 (1930), suggests the possibility and advantages of giving the
injured party his election to sue the general employer or the independent
contractor, as well as the feasibility of allowing the exceptions to the general
rule to supersede the rule itself; Harper, The Law of Tort, Sec. 292; Morris,
The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 Illinois L. Rev. 339 (1934) ;
Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 Indiana L. J. 494 (1935), suggesting that "upon both 'judge's
reasoning' and 'law professor's rationalizations' we are entitled to expect a
uniform rule of joint liability of the independent contractor and his employer,"
but that such rule does not exist and will not be immediately forthcoming.
'Downey v. National Exchange Bank (1912), 52 Ind. App. 672, 96 N. E.
403; Burton v. U. S. (1905), 196 U. S. 283, 25 S. Ct. 243; Michie on Banks &
Banking, Vol. 5, page 9.

